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Abstract  
Ethiopia is one of the leading aid recipient countries in the world and Africa with 5-6 millions peoples 
approximately requiring urgent food assistance on a non-stop basis in rural areas alone. The country receives 
between 20-30 % of the food aid allotted to sub-Saharan Africa. Attributed to ill-favored aid architecture 
including the local political economy and targeting mechanisms, according evidences drawn from empirical 
research works, currently in the country, food aid is bringing more harm than good with a serious of debilitating 
repercussions on local development especially, on the socio-economic issues. This paper is based on critical 
review empirical research works of the scenarios of the sate of  food aid and food aid dependence in selected 
regional states of Ethiopia (Amhara, Tigray, Somali, Afar and South Nations Nationalities and Peoples Regional 
States) with the main objective of assessing the impact of food aid dependence on social and economic issues 
across the various regions of the country and to see whether food aid provisions are married to patronage of 
politically motivated objectives to maintain the political interest of the government and donors or to really 
support the needy. The result of this review show that food aid has substantial impacts on local market and 
production, local consumption pattern, and creating dependency syndrome and moral hazards mainly due to poor 
management, mode of delivery, political-favoritism and targeting mechanisms. This paper recommends that for 
food aid to be effective in helping the needy and assist local development efforts there has to be efficient 
targeting mechanism that hardly allows targeting errors of inclusion and exclusion and nepotism. Food aid 
programs should also be re-engineered in a manner that helps recipients’ in long-term asset creation and welfare 
of the people. 
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1. Introduction 
Today Africa faces the world’s gravest hunger problems with high rate of aid dependency syndrome. Even more 
disturbing, Africa is the only continent where hunger problem is projected to worsen over the next two decades 
and currently, produces less food per person than three decades ago and remains one of the most malnourished 
regions in the world (John, 2009). 
From sub-Saharan Africa, the Ethiopian economy is among the most vulnerable. Each year on average, about 
four million people in the rural areas have problem of securing enough food for themselves, and need assistance 
(FDRE
3
, 2002). The economy is heavily dependent on the agricultural sector, which is characterized by 
dwindling production and productivity picturing the country to be one of the countries in the world consistently 
receiving substantial quantities of food aid. Famine and drought are the most documented natural disasters that 
occur in Ethiopia becoming part of the recent history of human misery. The history of famine in Ethiopia caused 
by drought dates back to 11
th
 century and according to the Ethiopian Red Cross Societies between 1900 till to 
date, about 18 periods of famine recorded (EEA/EEPRI
4
, 2004). As a result, the country has become a net food 
importer since 1959/60 (Abraham 1994:213 cited in UNDP, 2000). Over the last twenty years or more, an annual 
average of 800,000 tons of food aid was imported to address food insecurity in the vulnerable regions of the 
country. The highest food aid import had occurred during the 1984/85 crisis in which the imported volume 
reached 26.2 percent of domestic production of food crops (FDRE, 2001). 
There is no doubt that food aid is of a great significance for Ethiopia with millions of starving people, especially 
when it is deployed effectively in an accountable manner as part of a wider development strategy; it makes a 
lasting difference in helping the needy and assist local development efforts. The proponents of aid like Sachs 
(2005) and Levinsohn and Margaret (2007) say that the poor in developing countries cannot afford to save and 
are thus trapped in a cycle of poverty and this cycle can be broken by massive increase in aid since the ultimate 
objective of food aid is poverty alleviation. According to the above authors, food aid is an effective means of 
decreasing starvation; when used for food for work programs, it stimulates local development; and by reducing 
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the need for food imports it has prevented large cumulative deficits in poor countries. In parallel, Fraser and 
Whitefield (2008) note that food aid is of a great significance for Ethiopia with millions of starving people, 
especially when it is deployed effectively in an accountable manner while respecting the country’s food aid 
sovereignty, as part of a wider development strategy; it makes a lasting difference in helping the needy and 
hungry and assists local development efforts. Food aid programs, either in the form of free food or food-for-work 
are vital to the health, improving nutritional status and wellbeing of many food deficit households.  
However, all those advantages of food aid are not without debilitating costs. Wemos (2005) argue that food aid 
is a necessary evil; it should only be given for short period to overcome disaster. Arguments show that food aid 
often does more evil than good. The cost associated with long-term food aid dependence includes; the collapse 
of national price, labor disincentives, changed food habit, declining of local food production, and local markets 
and declining incentives to improve local infrastructure (Ibid). Supplementing Wemos’s arguments, Easterly 
(2006) mentions the evils of dependency on food aid includes; damaging of democracy, displacing local 
concerns and solutions, rampant corruption, constraining the policymaking options of aid receiving countries by 
demanding that their aid is spent on their priorities (i.e. in return to much needed finance, recipient governments 
change their economic and social policies), imposing policies and sequence of reforms (political, institutional 
and policy) and spending priorities, institutional overload and capacity weakening, loss of sovereignty and 
weakened ownership of policies and plans, revenue instability, repetitive budgeting, budget fragmentation, and 
the undermining of accountability and democratic decision-making. 
Attributed to the limited aid negotiating capacity recipients have over ownership and control over foreign aid and 
end up conditionality and identify their priorities and the less power they have assumed to establish their own 
systems to coordinate donors and only accept aid that comes only on their terms adds up additional vulnerability( 
Fraser and Whitfield, 2008). 
Currently concerns are being raised regarding the efficiency and real benefit of different food aid programs to 
helping the needy recipients and assist local development efforts. According to reports made by independent 
bodies like Amnesty International and anecdotal evidences, in Ethiopia food aid is bringing more evil than good 
attributed to two major reasons from two sides; both from the donors and the recipient countries. The first one is 
the misuse of aid by some authorities within the country for personal economic and political gains and the way 
how aid is managed and given targeting those who deserve the aid. Even if it is clearly stated by the United 
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Right that access to adequate food supply is a nondiscriminatory right, 
the tendency of some local politicians within the country to selectively offer food aid received from donors 
favoring their political supporters in exchange for ballot cards to prolong their political tenure (vote buying and 
forge connections) is the other predicament limiting the far reaching impact of food aid (Caeyers and Dercon, 
2011). The other critic emerges from the donors’ political economy agenda and use of undemocratic and 
inappropriate policy conditionality upon the receiving country in a way that skews recipients’ accountability 
away from the citizens (Wemos, 2005). The lack of real policy ownership from the side of the recipient due to 
the donor centralized nature the food aid possess and the problem emanating from the mode of aid delivery are 
some of the reasons restricting the far reaching impact of aid in helping the deserving and assist local 
development efforts of the country flourish. To this connection, the aim of this paper is to explore the impact the 
current food aid scenarios on social and economic issues based on review of empirical research works conducted 
mainly in five Regional States of Ethiopia (Amhara, Tigray, Afar, Somale and South Nations Nationalities and 
People’s Regional States).  
The impetus to deal with this research review springs from the very fact that currently in Ethiopia it is not 
uncommon to observe a number of food aid giving international NGOs and agencies, however, the impact of the 
aid in narrowing up the gap of poverty, helping the needy and assist local development efforts is minimal. 
Research outcomes, anecdotal evidences and independent reports by organizations show that instead poverty is 
growing, hunger is mounting (last year alone FAO (2011) in its report mentions the number of people requiring 
an urgent food assistance increased from 2.8 to 3.2 million as compared to the previous year), aid dependency 
syndrome is increasing, food price is sky rocketing, self-reliance is diminishing, local concerns, priorities and 
solutions are being displaced and systematic impositions of policies and ideologies are becoming prominent. 
This research review hopes to make certain contributions to different stakeholders. The first contribution this 
research hoping to make is to the academic community as it may add certain elements to the emerging body of 
knowledge in the subject and will serve as means to instigate other research works. The second contribution of 
this research review is to policy makers and development practitioners. The third contribution is to aid giving 
agencies and NGOs as the finding of the study will help them consider the local situation and people’s demand.  
2.1 Ethiopia and its food aid history: Birds’-eye view of the past and the present 
Despite the historical motive of food aid which is about purely humanitarian, .i.e. to reduce hunger, famine and 
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human suffering too frequently political motives have impaired its far reaching impact in realizing its far 
reaching impact. Mainly after the Second World War food aid been a regular feature of international 
development programs. Food aid has also been used as a weapon to launch new marketing opportunities and 
promotion of American products so as to reduce surplus foods. While the USA was the leading food aid donor in 
the 1960s, the European Union (EU) was the largest food aid donor in the 1990s. 
Since at least 1980, Ethiopia has been structurally in food deficit. Though agriculture is the mainstay of the 
Ethiopia economy, its contribution to ensuring food security has dramatically declined and has failed to keep 
pace with the ever changing population growth (Devereux, 2000). Between1990-99 alone, Ethiopia received 795 
thousand Metric Tons of food aid annually. According to WFP (2011), currently, there are 5 to 6.2 million 
people in rural areas need food aid on a non-stop basis, even in good agricultural years which accounts 10% of 
total domestic grain production. 
Soon after 1974 the military junta, Derg
5
, came to power and made an attempt to manage relief activities by 
establishing Relief and Rehabilitation Commission  which paved the way for foreign aid agencies a point of 
entry, although its functions were jeopardized by many factors including lack of roads, storage facilities, 
transportation, and high fuel costs. During that period there was no early warning mechanism other than some 
nutritional surveillance program.  
As of 2005, the current Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) government, in order to 
address the food security situation and ensure food self sufficiency of household, has launched special programs, 
Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) and Other Food Security Program (OFSP).  
Nevertheless, Ethiopia remains ready to receive food aid every year, and the donors seem willing to continue 
providing food indefinitely (Devereux, 2004). Despite its relevance, its disadvantage is currently outweighing. 
Dependency syndrome is now rooted in the culture of the rural people (Fraser and Whitfield, 2008). Leave alone 
dependency at household level, government has also developed dependence on the western world for aid has 
been increasing. Relief has not been only institutionalized but also the expectation of relief assistance has 
become entrenched in the federal government’s budgetary planning (Ibid).  
2.2 Food aid definition and types 
According to Von Braun (2003), the definition of food aid should not just be focused on its source of funding, or 
by specific transactions, such as ‘items donated from external donors to recipient’, but should include 
consideration of a) all related international and domestic actions and programs, and b) the role of non-food 
resources brought to bear jointly with food to address key elements of hunger problems. As such, food aid can be 
understood as all food supported interventions aimed at improving the food security of poor people in the short 
and long term, whether funded via international, national, public and private resources.  
In the Ethiopian context there are three types of food delivery: project food aid, program food aid and emergency 
food aid. All three types have historically taken two major forms: free food distribution (FFD), which is 
generally categorized as ‘emergency’ distribution, and food-for-work (FFW), which targets on labor to work on 
creating assets in the process of channeling food to needy areas. 
• Emergency food aid: It distributes food for free in times of disaster and extreme food “insecurity”. 
• Programme food aid: is bilateral development support to governments of developing countries, which 
is sold for below market prices on the local market in order to generate income for the government. This 
conversion of food aid into cash is called the "monetization" of food aid. 
• Project aid: is provided to support specific activities and projects, mostly by aid and development 
organizations. The performance of this programme is poorly controlled. 
Wemos (2005) argue that if the original objective of the limited role of food aid is to be preserved and the 
dumping of food aid to be avoided, the prevailing power dominance of the rich nations on food production and 
distribution should not be abused. According to Wemos food sovereignty
6
 should be the first priority. The 
objective of food aid should be the: “alleviation of poverty and hunger of the most vulnerable groups, and 
consistent with agricultural development in those countries”. It should allow countries to establish and 
implement its own food policies in order to feed its whole population. 
Fraser and Whitefield (2008) in their paper dealing with politics of aid, they critically analyzed how the African 
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states deal with their sovereign rights in negotiating aid. They ask the question how African states use aid to 
pursue their own policy preferences, resisting donor priorities while still taking the aid. Their analysis focus on 
how African countries deal with donors regarding ownership and control and the degree of exercising those 
policies agreed upon during negotiation. In doing so they distinguish competing issues of ownership as control 
over implemented policies and ownership as commitment to a pre-determined policy set. They found out that 
Ethiopia is placed next to Botswana in terms of degree of control (Faresr and Whitefield, 2008). See Figure 1. 
The Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) government’s negotiating strategy has been to 
adapt those policy prescriptions of the bank that it finds acceptable and in accord with its development agenda 
despite the fact that Ethiopia is one of the leading aid recipient countries in the horn of Africa. According to 
Xavier and Smith (2007), Ethiopia does not want outsiders ‘in the kitchen’ and has retained ownership over its 
policy agenda greater than elsewhere.  
 
 
Figure 1.  Spectrum of Government Control in the Country Studies 
Source: Adapted from Freather and Whitefield (2008) 
Ethiopia is placed next in terms of the degree of control achieved. Unlike Botswana, Ethiopia remains aid 
dependent and receives an increasing share of its state finances from donors, yet the Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) government is in control of its development strategy, negotiating with 
donors only at the margins. The EPRDF government’s negotiating strategy, since it came to power in 1991, has 
been to adapt those policy prescriptions of the Bank and Fund that it finds acceptable to its own development 
agenda and to reject others. It has largely succeeded in controlling the pace and degree of reform (Fraser and 
Whitefield, 2008). 
2.3 Impact of political favoritism and connection and food aid targeting 
Targeting refers to the effort made to get food aid into the hands of the hungry people. Food aid targeting is 
defined as “restricting the coverage of an intervention to those who are perceived to be most at risk, in order to 
maximize the benefit of the intervention whilst minimizing the cost” (Jayne et al., 2000).  
Most households in Ethiopia does not understand the one who is targeted for aid and the quantity of food 
allocated per household (Gilligan and Hoddinot, 2005). A research conducted by PANE
7
 (2006) disclosed that 
despite the fact that most of the research districts have been receiving food aid for a long time, beneficiary 
communities have limited awareness about targeting mechanisms and the right of the vulnerable groups. PANE 
found out that respondents complained about lack of transparency and equity in aid targeting. Respondents put 
blame on distributors saying that they distribute aid based on political favoritism and nepotism. In addition, the 
finding further reported that except for few government officers, the communities do not participate in food aid 
assessment programmes.  
Political connection seems to matter in the free food allocation and targeting procedure in Ethiopia though only 
clearly in the period after the drought. In this period, targeting based on need seems to be only weakly 
significant. Households with political connection or in vertical network had more than 12 % point higher 
probability of obtaining food aid than other households (Caeyers and Dercon, 2011). Politician may use food aid 
to forge connection and for different forms of vote buying (ibid). 
2.4 Socio-Economic impacts of food aid in Ethiopia 
  2.4.1   Food aid impacts on local food market and local production 
Barrett (2006) studied the meso level unintended consequences of food aid on price; he asserted that food aid can 
drive down local (or national) food prices in three ways. First, monetization of food aid can flood the market, 
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increasing supply. Second, households receiving food aid may decrease demand for the commodity received or 
for locally produced substitutes or, if they produce substitutes or the commodity received, they may sell more of 
it. Finally, recipients may sell food aid to purchase other necessities or complements, driving down prices of the 
food aid commodity and its substitutes, but also increasing demand for complements. 
According to PANE (2006), the disincentive effects may result from targeted food aid for various reasons. The 
poor may receive more food aid than they need and sell the excess on the local market. Alternatively, targeted 
food aid, although intended only for the poor, may be distributed to the non-poor who otherwise would have 
purchased. These ‘un-needy’ recipients who have accepted free food will decrease their purchase of food from 
local markets resulting in a decrease in food demand and loss of sale for local producers. This will lead to a 
disincentive to the staple food producers and may cause local farmers to other activities than food production as 
the market shrinks. A study conducted by PANE in Afar Regional State of Ethiopia show that food aid has not 
contributed to improving agriculture or livestock production activities. 
PANE (2006) summarized the impact of food aid from an economic viewpoint on local market and production 
saying that programme food aid functions in deficit years to fill the gap between demand at existing prices and 
income levels, on one hand, and the normal available supply of food through domestic production, on the other 
hand. The economic impact of food aid is based on the fact that introduction of more grain into the market 
decreases the price of grain. If food aid is sold in the open market at a market-clearing price, the price of cereals 
will fall. This means lower prices for local producers and cheaper food for local consumers. Decreasing prices 
mean that producers’ profits will diminish which will lead to decreased production. 
2.4.2 Food Aid impacts in distorting local consumption pattern  
The delivery of food aid often involve foods which are exotic to that country, e.g. wheat or rice, which results in 
people developing a taste for those foreign foods, creating a future demand and bringing disincentive by in the  
production of local grain. As Wemos (2005) noted, the objective of America behind food aid in kind holds the 
promotion of trade in the name of pure humanitarian purpose of aid. On the contrary, Barrett and Maxwell 
(2005) show that the objective of food aid in its objective of promoting trade by changing consumers’ 
preference, to introduce to the new foods and thereby endogenously stimulate demand for foods with which they 
were previously unfamiliar or formerly accounts only a minor share of their diet has failed. In Ethiopia, the 
government has developed a strategic grain reserve supplied from local stocks for use in emergencies. One 
function of this is to avoid creation of a demand for imported foods. 
The empirical research works disclosed that in situations where delivery of food aid involves foods normally 
foreign to that area, a taste for foreign foods often develops creating future demand for those foods thereby 
depressing the production of local grain. A research conducted by PANE(2006) in Ethiopia show that in Asaita 
of Afar Regional State, food aid has reportedly replaced the consumption of maize bread (qixa) eaten with milk, 
with wheat bread (qixa) eaten with chickpea sauce (shirowat). In Shininle Zone of Somali Regional State 
respondents indicated that food aid has caused some change in the dietary habits of the community by 
introducing new foods that were unknown before.  
2.4.3 Food aid impacts, moral hazards, labor disincentive and dependency 
From literatures we can understand that some of the frequently mentioned debilitating impacts of food aid have a 
strong domain in severely paralyzing people’s attitude towards agricultural activities, bringing large scale labor 
disincentive and deep rooted dependency.  
Barrett (2006) in his review work mentions how the Ethiopian farmers in a food for work (FFW) program 
planted trees upside down in their anticipation to allegedly encourage the ongoing delivery of food aid program. 
According to him this shows a community-wide moral hazard. Samuel (2006) writes in his research article 
entitled ‘Food aid and Small-holder agriculture in Ethiopia’ a typical example of moral hazard and how the 
Ethiopian framers are accustomed to food aid. The story reads like this: the farmer in Amhara Regional state 
when asked about the weather in his village he replied ‘I pray for the good weather in Canada to continue’. 
Samuel (2006) in a separate study also noted that this aid dependency syndrome now is rooted in culture of rural 
people in Ethiopia.  They say that the not long ago proud Ethiopians, who hardly sought credit let alone “aid” 
now began to account for food quota in the reciprocal traditional wedding statement, that is pronounced as 
Habitish, Habte (meaning, your property is my property) by supplementing it with Erdatash, Erdtaye (meaning, 
your aid quota is my quota). 
A study conducted by Oxfam Great Britain (2004) on the impact of food aid in Tigray and Amhara regional 
states of Ethiopia assessed the issue of food aid dependency. The study concluded that dependency exists in most 
cases when relief food is supplied to the needy people freely. Households suspending productive work on their 
farm plots in preference to waiting for food aid also manifest dependency. 
Empirical research works and literatures agree that most of those unintended consequences of food aid bring 
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labor and production disincentive and others are the result of an ill-favored mode of delivery and targeting error 
of inclusion. Barrett (2006) noted that perhaps the most pervasive and we believe, misguided claim is that food 
aid somehow makes people lazy, that food aid unintentionally discourages people from working. It is certainly 
true that microeconomic theory suggests that because transfers increase recipients’ welfare, they generate 
income effects that will tend to reduce labor supply simply because even hard-working people prefer more 
leisure to less. Evidences demonstrate that the labor supply becomes more responsive to change in income as 
people grow wealthier. The implication is that targeting errors on inclusion magnify the labor market 
disincentive. According to Barrett, a slightly different sort of labor distortion can arise when food-for-work 
(FFW) programs are relatively more attractive than work on recipients’ own farms/businesses, either because the 
FFW pays immediately, or because the household considers the payoffs to the FFW project to be higher than the 
returns to labor on its own plots. 
From these studies conducted within the five Regional States of Ethiopia it is found that the propensity to engage 
and contribute labor to agricultural and non-agricultural business activities dwindles for those households who 
have previous exposure to food aid than those who have no exposure. A study conducted in Ethiopia and 
reviewed by Hodinott (2003) showed that households that had previously received food aid spent considerably 
less time supplying labor to permanent and semi-permanent crops. Less time was also spent on non-agricultural 
business activities. On average, households not receiving food aid worked five times as many days in these 
activities than households that had received food aid. However, children in households receiving food aid spent 
more time in wage work than children in households not receiving food aid. In terms of improving agricultural 
activities, discussants argue that there has been a slight improvement in soil fertility through food–for–work 
programmes. However, they reported a negative impact on marketing local agricultural products. They also 
mentioned that there is now a weak attitude towards agricultural activities that that has led to the decreased 
productivity of farmers as a result of food aid distribution. In Humbo area of the South Nations and Nationalities 
People’s Region of Ethiopia, a negative consequence of food aid activity on asset creation was reported. The 
community cannot accumulate wealth because of food aid, as they would rather lose valuable assets in order to 
be included during the selection of beneficiaries, resulting in lack of oxen for agricultural activities affecting 
production. 
 
3. Conclusion and Directions 
From the review of empirical research works and literatures across regions of Ethiopia, it is found out that lack 
of transparency and equity in aid targeting is prevalent which is manifested by an ill-favored aid distribution 
based on political favoritism and nepotism. Findings further show that except for few government officers, the 
communities do not participate in food aid assessment programmes have no acquaintance pertaining the 
targeting mechanisms. 
As far as the socio-economic impacts of food aid concerned three major areas concern have been observed.  
Food aid impact on local market and production, aid impacts in relation to the local consumption pattern, food 
aid impacts on dependency and moral hazards are the major elements.  
Research findings revealed that the unintended meso-level consequences of food aid on local market and price 
can be seen from three perspectives. First, monetization of food aid can flood the market, increasing supply. 
Second, households receiving food aid may decrease demand for the commodity received or for locally produced 
substitutes or, if they produce substitutes or the commodity received, they may sell more of it. Finally, recipients 
may sell food aid to purchase other necessities or complements, driving down prices of the food aid commodity 
and its substitutes, but also increasing demand for complements. 
The promotion of exotic food in the form of food aid plays a role in switching the local dietary pattern by 
developing taste for those foreign foods and creating a future demand and bringing disincentive in the production 
of local grain. 
The existing situation in Ethiopia clearly demonstrates that the overall aid architecture is problematic and instead 
of ensuring peoples welfare level rather leading to a number of multifaceted plights and predicaments. Some of 
the directions/recommendations proposed from the findings are as follows: 
• Food aid should serve as a short term solution and provided when it is most needed. 
• So as to minimize challenges emanating from aid provision married to patronage of clientelism and 
political favoritism and minimize targeting errors and ensure equity and transparency, the involvement 
of the local people in food aid need targeting and beneficiary selection deemed crucial.  
• The government should look into alternative aid delivery mechanisms and type of aid provided to the 
people. For instance, if there is domestic market for food, cash handouts/transfer to the needy is by far 
important than food transfer.  
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• Currently food aid does not contribute to secure people’s long term welfare and the creation of asset. 
Emphasis should be given to development projects having a substantial significance in boosting up 
peoples welfare level and creation of productive assets.  
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